Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/11147/13649
Title: Field Experiments in Bargaining
Authors: Dindaroğlu, Burak
Ertaç, Seda
Publisher: Springer
Abstract: Understanding price formation and surplus division in bargaining contexts has long been of interest to economists. Laboratory experiments contribute to our understanding of bargaining by inducing valuations and costs, which are usually unobserved in natural negotiation settings, and allow control over the negotiation process. Field experiments, on the other hand, allow economists to study bargaining in more natural contexts with higher external validity, and can be particularly useful when bargaining behavior draws on context-specific characteristics and experiences that may be stripped in lab settings or involves biases that would not surface under observability. In this chapter, we provide an overview of field experiments studying bargaining behavior and outcomes in a variety of settings, from bargaining for auto rickshaw to markets for livestock. We offer a methodological discussion, position field experiments in bargaining in the tradition of field experiments in economics at large, and highlight difficulties in the design and implementation of fieldwork for such environments. We also discuss potential areas and issues where future field experiments are of special importance for understanding price formation in bargaining. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022.
URI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_16
https://hdl.handle.net/11147/13649
ISBN: 9783030766665
9783030766658
Appears in Collections:Rectorate / Rektörlük
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection

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