Now showing items 1-5 of 5
Comparing the pre- and post-specified peer models for key agreement
In the pre-specified peer model for key agreement, it is assumed that a party knows the identifier of its intended communicating peer when it commences a protocol run. On the other hand, a party in the post-specified peer ...
Security arguments for the UM key agreement protocol in the NIST SP 800-56A standard
(ACM Press, 2008)
The Unified Model (UM) key agreement protocol is an efficient Diffie-Hellman scheme that has been included in many cryptographic standards, most recently in the NIST SP 800-56A standard. The UM protocol is believed to ...
Towards denial-of-service-resilient key agreement protocols
Denial of service resilience is an important practical consideration for key agreement protocols in any hostile environment such as the Internet. There are well-known models that consider the security of key agreement ...
On the importance of public-key validation in the MQV and HMQV key agreement protocols
HMQV is a hashed variant of the MQV key agreement protocol proposed by Krawczyk at CRYPTO 2005. In this paper, we present some attacks on HMQV and MQV that are successful if public keys are not properly validated. In ...
Reusing static keys in key agreement protocols
Contrary to conventional cryptographic wisdom, the NIST SP 800-56A standard explicitly allows the use of a static key pair in more than one of the key establishment protocols described in the standard. In this paper, we ...