

Chapter 12

**HYPHENATED IDENTITIES:
THE RECEPTION OF TURKISH GERMAN
CINEMA IN THE TURKISH DAILY PRESS**

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The success of Turkish German filmmaker Fatih Akın initiated new debates on the identity of Turkish diasporic filmmakers in Germany. While star director Akın and other Turkish German filmmakers have been celebrated in the German media with the slogan “the new German cinema is Turkish,” the Turkish media seems to downplay the German side of their hyphenated identity.¹ Instead, the Turkish press uses the achievements of these Turkish filmmakers in Germany to bolster a positive image for Turkey in an international context.

In this essay, I am particularly concerned with how hyphenated identities, which allow for “simultaneous denial and acceptance of their cultural and ethnic specificities,” are reconstructed in Turkey in the context of wider Turkish politics (Mani 2007: 124). Investigating the reception of these filmmakers in the Turkish press sheds light on a number of pertinent issues. First, the Turkish press utilizes the success of the filmmakers in order to make a case about Turkey’s accession to the EU. The emotionally charged controversies surrounding Turkish German filmmakers suggest that more is at stake than just the reputations of individual filmmakers. Second, it also endeavors to establish a national sentiment about Turkish identity by making them appear more or even exclusively Turkish. Celebrating the international success of these hyphenated filmmakers seems to be intended to revive Turkish national pride. Particularly prominent in the press are nationalist discourses, which challenge the filmmakers’ ambiguous sense of belonging (for a comparative perspective, see Karolin Machtans in this volume).

Focusing on the coverage of the Turkish German cinema in newspapers, this essay constitutes only *one* aspect of the overall reception of Turkish

German cinema in Turkey, and does not claim to be exhaustive. Nonetheless I argue that the daily newspapers are by far the most important media sector in Turkey. According to a recent report published by the Turkish National Statistics Institution (TÜİK), there are currently 6,073 newspapers and magazines published in Turkey, and the total circulation figure for 2009 was around 2.3 billion, of which newspapers accounted for 94.4 percent (TÜİK 2010).² These figures clearly suggest that magazines in general, let alone specialist film publications, are far less influential in terms of shaping public opinion than daily newspapers. Specialist film magazines are more concerned with issues of film aesthetics, genre, narrative, and, in terms of their coverage of Turkish German cinema, comparable to other international film magazines. The study of these specialist publications would therefore have been less revealing than the close reading of news items in the Turkish daily press. This does not mean that reviews in newspapers' art and culture sections do not provide insightful analyses of the films themselves, but when it comes to Turkish German filmmakers, such examples seem to be the exception rather than the rule. This alone is evidence that the discussion of Turkish German films and filmmakers in the Turkish press is a special case worth investigating.

The politics of the Turkish press is crucial to understanding its role in the reproduction of ideologies such as Turkish nationalism.³ Chart 1 and Chart 2, which are based on my readings of pertinent news items, reviews, and commentaries, are not conclusive, but aim to present a compact yet informative classification of the Turkish press, and are devised to facilitate following the correlations between the papers' ideologies and their particular coverage of Turkish German filmmakers.

Filmmakers or Diplomatic Ambassadors?

It is widely known that migrant-sending peripheral countries hugely benefit from the economic contribution of their populations abroad.⁴ Yet Turkey's relation with its diasporic subjects has moved beyond dependence on remittances only. Diasporas across the world have gained ever more significance in international affairs (Davies 2007: 62). Today what matters more is the powerful role they play in terms of the representation of the sending country. "The conditions of the Turks in Germany take on added significance given the relationship of Turkey to the European Union (EU) ... which sensitizes the border between Turkey and the EU, between the Germans and the Turks" (Halle 2008: 142). In this context, Turks in the diaspora, particularly those in one of the most important and powerful countries in the union, become strong political actors. In so far as "Turkey is seen through the prism of experience of Turkish diaspora" in Europe (Giddens et al. 2004: 29), the recent achievements of Turkish German filmmakers, who are simultaneously

Turkish and German, have come into prominence. This is not only because their hyphenated identities provide the means for newspapers to speculate about their national belonging, but also due to the increased recognition they receive in an international context. They are constructed as representatives of the entire Turkish nation in the Turkish press, and are expected to epitomize the concept of Turkishness.

Furthermore, integration into the EU has always had a symbolic meaning for Turkish people as it is regarded as the culmination of





Figure 12.1 Attitude toward EU Accession in the Turkish Press (above) and Nationalist Tone in the Turkish Press (below), Charts

Atatürk's vision to reach the level of contemporary civilizations.⁵ The so-called "social engineering project" (Keyder 1997) led by Atatürk in the early years of the Turkish Republic can actually be formulated as "global modernity = European civilization = Westernization" (Kahraman and Keyman 1998: 72), underlining the foundational role the Westernization principle played in the process.⁶ Consequently, any incident regarding the relations between Turkey and the EU has occupied a significant place in the political agenda of the Turkish state, and more generally, in the Turkish public sphere; hence the importance and resulting high coverage of this issue in the Turkish press.

With regards to the press coverage of Turkish German filmmakers in general, there were hardly any news items about them until the mid-2000s. This changed in 2004 with Fatih Akin's award-winning film *Gegen die Wand* (*Head-On*, 2004), which can be seen as a turning point for the international recognition of Turkish German cinema.⁷ As a result, Akin has indisputably attracted the most extensive attention from the Turkish press. As Erdoğan puts it, "in fact, any mention of Turkish German cinema is more likely to conjure up his name than that of other talented Turkish German auteurs" (2009: 27). However, in the majority of cases, this is not merely due to his directorial merits or the artistic quality of his films, but rather to a combination of diverse factors; namely, his amusing personality, rhetorical skills, and the political messages he embeds in his public speeches and interviews. This, at the same time, indicates that in Turkey, Turkish German filmmakers still do not have enough importance to generate news, and for that reason, they are mostly represented in relation to wider thematic frameworks such as Turkish-EU relations and identity politics.

Upon receiving the Golden Bear for *Head-On*, Akin became the focus of national interest in Turkey for a variety of reasons that had little to do with the film's aesthetic merits. What *Hürriyet*, as a mainstream nationalist paper, was really interested in was Akin's attitude toward Turkey's position within the EU. "If I made a film about Turkey's accession to the EU, it would have a happy ending. There are millions of Turks already living in the EU in general and in Germany in particular. They are part of the society. In practice, Turkey is already in the EU thanks to the existence of these people. Why should we not make Turkey an official member of the EU then?" (*Hürriyet* 2004).⁸ By articulating sentiments widespread among the Turkish population, Akin expresses Turkey's demands for a fair and inclusive negotiation process.⁹ However, Akin on his own is not responsible for reiterating the subject. It is the persistent questioning and encouraging of journalists that ensures Akin takes up his presumed role as a cultural representative and a political ambassador of his country of origin. Hereby a deprived, unwanted, but proud self (Turkey/Turkish) is constructed through and against a privileged and judging Other (Europe/European).

When it comes to the liberal mainstream papers, the subtlety in the nationalist tone is immediately noticeable. As in other Turkish newspapers, the news items in *Radikal* are mainly politicized; references to Turkey's accession to the EU still set the tone of the news items even where films and filmmakers are concerned. However, the majority of the news stories and articles in *Radikal* contain film analysis, bringing the issue of aesthetics into the discussion. In accordance with the stress on the artistic merits of the filmmakers, these journalists generally refrain from resorting to any essentialist definition of national identity. Instead, they underscore the possibility of multiple belongings and hybridity and address the filmmakers carefully as Turkish Germans.

The journalistic portraits of Turkish German filmmakers in leftwing Turkish newspapers differ remarkably from those in mainstream nationalist papers in terms of language and attitude. *Cumhuriyet*, as the nationalist Kemalist representative of the Turkish press, uses the success story of the film *Head-On* to highlight invidious EU policies in connection with Turkey's accession to the EU. The fact that the opera version of the film received a European Tolerance Award in 2009 suggests that not only in Turkey, but also abroad, Turkish German filmmakers are seen as messengers of their country of origin. The fact that the foreign newspapers, too, represent these filmmakers as cultural ambassadors corresponds to the stance of the Turkish press. One particular article about this award emphasizes the comments of Dieter Kopp, the president of the European Cultural Assembly, on Turkish-EU relations (*Cumhuriyet* 2009). Kopp states that the opera contributed remarkably to Turkish German relations, and it is incomprehensible that Turkey, in spite of its enormous potential, is excluded from the EU. Conveying the message by quoting a European representative's declaration that Turkey deserves to become a member of the EU unmistakably presents an unbiased account of the issue. This at the same time befits the paper's tacit Eurosceptic ideological stance.¹⁰

When considering news coverage in an explicitly Kurdish newspaper such as *Evensel*, one should bear in mind the enduring Kurdish-Turkish conflict, and the fact that the EU represents the agency that monitors human rights violations. Since Kurdish people in Turkey claim to be subject to discrimination and official oppressive policies, they envisage Turkey's accession to the EU as a progressive move.¹¹ So does *Evensel*. These factors influence the paper's approach toward Turkish German filmmakers, interwoven with the process of Turkey's inclusion in the EU. Correspondingly Aydın Yıldırım and Suzan Işık (2007) evaluate Akın's film *Auf der anderen Seite* (*The Edge of Heaven*, 2007) with reference to Turkey's relationship to the EU through a focus on the film's character developments. They argue that Ayten, Lotte, and her mother Susanne, represent different levels of agency and alternative points of view in regard to Turkish-EU relations. Rather than speculating about Akın's hyphenated identity, they

focus solely on the film's structure and narrative based on the fact that the film deals explicitly with Turkish-EU relations.

In brief, every newspaper in Turkey seems to attribute significance to Turkey's accession to the EU and to consider the issue as a newsworthy subject matter. The only exceptions to this are papers such as *Zaman*, on the one hand, and *Yeni Şafak* and *Yeni Çağ*, on the other, which can be considered as Islamist and extreme rightwing respectively. Their predictable lack of coverage is probably due to their traditionalist and conservative perception of the EU, which, in its current structure, is seen as a Christian Union.¹² Overall, the newspapers exploit Turkish German filmmakers and their success either in order to support their pro-EU perspective or to underline their skepticism of the union based on its presumed insincerity and mistreatment of Turkey.

The Ceaseless Battle of Inclusion and Exclusion

The Turkish press endorses a feeling of identification with Europe while at the same time engendering a sense of hostility. The dominant negative perception of Turkey by Europeans, as a "threat" that would change the union's values and could easily become a burden on its structure and capacity as a "large, poor, Muslim" country (Negrine et al. 2008), enhances the sense of rejection and exclusion among Turkish people. This instigates a strong sense of frustration and resentment caused by being subjected to an incessant process of othering by Europeans who oppose Turkey's membership in the EU; hence the newspapers, especially the nationalist ones, continuously attempt to reinvigorate national pride by reiterating successful stories of individuals in tandem with a reconstructed glorious past.

"Narratives not only endow particular events with meaning, thus helping us understand and make sense of the social world, but also serve as tools of identity construction" (Mihelj et al. 2009: 59). Accordingly news coverage in the Turkish press concerning Turkish German filmmakers constitutes a metanarrative that serves to stimulate national pride. Of all the newspapers examined, the mainstream ones with a populist and nationalist attitude persistently accentuate the Turkishness of the filmmakers in question. In a parallel manner, when a Turkish German filmmaker makes displeasing comments that would hurt this sense of national pride or endanger the reputation of Turkish identity, the overwhelming reaction of the Turkish press is disavowal and exclusion, an emphasis on the other side of the hyphenated identity. Hence the reception continually wavers between ambivalent commentaries about inclusion in and exclusion from the Turkish nation state.

"What makes hybridity dubious is its complete dependence on location and affiliation—be it ethnic, national, religious, gendered, or even

linguistic—in order to dislocate and disaffiliate” (Mani 2007: 125–26). Hybridity thereby implies instability and negotiation. It does not provide straightforward lines of affiliation, nor “does it resolve the tension between two cultures” (Bhabha 1994: 113). Turkish German filmmakers can be considered culturally hybrid subjects, but Turkish journalists use the ambiguity of hybridity to reinvigorate national identity.

The recurrent attempts to reassure readers of Turkey’s national worthiness imply a widespread lack of self-esteem. But why does Turkishness require such an approval at all? The explanation for this draws on two closely interlinked issues: first, the impact of the totalitarian modernization project introduced by the founders of the republic, which ultimately cut the entire nation’s connection with its traditions and history; and second, the resultant identity crisis the Turkish nation has endured.

Bozkurt Güvenç suggests that a sense of inferiority has shaped the self-perception of the Turkish nation from the beginning, for the term “Turk” is considered to be relatively new and without an efficiently written history (2005: 19–52).¹³ Ottoman identity was not simply associated with Turkish identity (Lewis 1988); the theorization of Turkishness was introduced by Turkish politicians and theorists at the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁴ The construction of an imagined Turkish identity was also shaped by the state-controlled curriculum of modernization that aspired to create a cohesive society based upon values exported from the west. Therefore, the foundation of the Turkish nation state was closely interconnected with the ideal of Westernization while erasing the memories of the Ottoman Empire. Having taken European modernity as a reference point to define and understand its own experiences, the historical, intellectual, and political trajectories of Turkey have been determined by its dependence on Europe (Göle 1998: 58–59). The superior position, however contradictory, willingly ceded to Europe has inevitably brought about a process of self-othering. The result has been a continuous concerted effort to resemble Europeans, to become part of Europe, to be recognized by it. Turkish identity is perpetually imagined and constructed in relation to Europe, leading to an ambivalent sense of self because Turkey has long been denied any proximity by its everlasting object of desire.

Consequently the constant reproduction and reaffirmation of national identity has become necessary in mitigating the concomitant feeling of inferiority toward the idealized European Other. The mundane nature of nationalism epitomized by routine symbols such as national songs, sporting events, and flags requires a special awareness of discourses that reproduce nation and nationhood undetected. “Banal nationalism,” as conceptualized by Michael Billig (1995), “covers all those unnoticed, routine practices, ideological habits, beliefs and representations that make the daily reproduction of nations ... possible” (Yumul and Özkırmımlı 2000: 788). In this context, the press acts as a very efficient apparatus to flag nationhood on daily basis.¹⁵ There is a discernible continuity concerning this process

as the earlier press coverage of Turkish filmmakers in Germany registers similar patterns.

The 1980s were a difficult period for Turkey, marked by political and social turmoil in the aftermath of the third coup d'état in the country's history. Busy with domestic problems, governments could not prioritize Turkish-EU relations; hence the lack of editorial interest in the issue. Instead news stories about neo-Nazi attacks targeting Turks in Germany and the mistreatment of Turkish guestworkers by German authorities and society predominated from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. Mainstream papers such as *Hürriyet* and *Sabah* reported these events in narratives that constructed a familiar discursive universe of "us" versus "them." Personalized sentimental stories such as "This Baby is Orphaned by Skinheads" (*Hürriyet* 1986a), "Skinhead Violence is Spreading" (*Hürriyet* 1986b) and "Heroic Turk" (*Günaydın* 1986) appeared on the front pages and were used to enhance the impact of comments on the German judiciary system being unjust and discriminatory. While different in content, the discursive strategies of the mainstream newspapers in the past exhibit certain correlations with those of the present: a nationalist political discourse based on binary oppositions frames the circulation of images of Turks as victimized subjects and/or undervalued national heroes.

Despite an intense interest in the sociopolitical situation concerning the Turkish community in Germany, none of the papers, *Cumhuriyet* being the exception, devoted much attention to Tefrik Başer, who happened to represent the Turkish community in his social realistic films at the time. This noticeable neglect can be explained through the political pressures on publishers, namely, strict censorship and intimidation policies, broad-spectrum depoliticization of society, and the privatization and tabloidization of the press. More importantly, Başer was seen as a leftist intellectual, employing a critical cinematic language to deal with serious controversial issues such as patriarchal Turkish culture, the resultant oppression of women, and the experience of Turkish political exiles forced to flee the country as a result of the last military coup. All these were subjects the government of Turkey would rather cover up than reveal. Only the Kemalist *Cumhuriyet*, which was associated with the leftist rebellion at the time, put an emphasis on Başer and his films. However critically informed and analytical the reviews were, it is still striking that the interest in the filmmaker increased only during international film festivals when his films were found worthy of nomination.¹⁶ He was continuously addressed as a successful young Turkish filmmaker, and discussed only in terms of his impact on European film critics and audiences.

Newspapers with varied ideological affiliations continue to subscribe to differing interpretations of the hyphenated identities of Turkish German filmmakers today. The case of Sibel Kekilli exemplifies the link between national pride and the achievements of prominent, successful Turks in interesting ways. As soon as the German tabloid *Bild* disclosed

the private life of the lead actress in *Head-On*, revealing that she used to work as a porn actress, the Turkish press vacillated in their response. The otherwise proudly patriarchal and traditional Turkish press acted rather unexpectedly on this issue. In his article entitled "Crusades against Kekilli," Yalçın Doğan (2004) condemned the German press for covering the issue in a very derogatory manner. The attacks on Kekilli were treated as if they were a matter of national importance, and consequently, she had to be protected against the evil unleashed by the "other" nation's press. Doğan alleged that the German press did not want to acknowledge the success of a Turkish film and, for that reason, despicably assaulted the actress to undermine the credibility of the film. Likewise, Fatih Altaylı, who is infamous for his sexist as well as nationalist attitude, commented on the same issue by surprisingly taking sides with Kekilli (2004; compare Arslan 2006). This unexpected response is clearly driven by national sensitivities: Kekilli, in her relationship with the critical German press, stands for the entire Turkish nation, and therefore Altaylı readily reframes his presumed ideals and values to save the country's honor.

Liberal mainstream *Radikal* appears to emphasize the issue of national identity and multiple belongings despite readily categorizing Turkish German filmmakers under the umbrella term "Turks" regardless of their ethnic origin or more complicated affiliations. Accordingly journalists often question filmmakers about their sense of belonging in articles investigating their transnational and/or hybrid identities. The second-generation filmmaker Ayşe Polat's response to a question about how she describes her identity underscores the complexity of the issue, for she states that she is simultaneously German, Turkish, and Kurdish. Moreover, being a Shiite, as she stresses, constitutes her sub-identity (Başutçu 2004). Similarly the third-generation Turkish German filmmaker Özgür Yıldırım is sometimes questioned on his identity (Akça 2008). The filmmaker's comments on the issue shed light on the changing self-perception of the Turkish community in Germany inasmuch as he claims not to be interested in the Turkish versus German division at all. Another Turkish German filmmaker who is repeatedly exposed to questions about his "double occupancy" is Thomas Arslan. He, too, insistently refuses to define himself according to national affiliations (Şirin 2008). Unlike Fatih Akın, less popular Turkish German filmmakers, who still seem to be confined to a niche, appear to act much more courageously. As a result, they are neglected by the mainstream populist nationalist or rightwing papers in Turkey.

Leftwing newspapers engage in a discussion more attentive to ethnic identity than the emphasis on the nationality of Turkish German filmmakers. *Evensel* systematically contests the homogenizing classifications of Turkish German filmmakers merely as Turks. Instead the paper generally addresses them as filmmakers originating from Turkey, which conclusively puts the emphasis on the country of origin rather than on nationality. In this respect, filmmakers such as Züli Aladağ, Yüksel

Yavuz, and Ayşe Polat are explicitly described as Kurdish. The paper attempts to construct a counternationalist discourse that challenges the attitude of the hegemonic Turkish press. In either way, the newspapers employ Turkish German filmmakers in order to establish their political narratives around national sensitivities.

Turkish German filmmakers attract more attention from the rightwing and political Islamist representatives of the Turkish press when the issue is their identity rather than their role in Turkish-EU relations. The most striking coverage in the far right paper *Yeni Çağ* concerns Akın's declaration about his compulsory military service in Turkey. Akın controversially stated that he was a pacifist and would prefer to renounce his Turkish passport rather than do military service. Abdullah Özdoğan attacks Akın for being a traitor in a nationalist and populist text: "The name destiny gives to people is sometimes a blessing and sometimes a curse. For instance, the biggest enemy of the Turks might have a Turkish name. Or destiny might give the name of a great Turkish soldier to someone who rascally tries to avoid military service" (Özdoğan 2007).¹⁷

Nezih Erdoğan, elaborating on the same news item, argues that the author "conflates the values associated with national identity with the actual 'piece of paper' that he calls *kimlik* (identity) and states that if Akın were to give up his Turkish identity card, he would be renouncing his Turkish self" (2009: 33). Özdoğan warns Turkish readers about this "deviant traitor" who betrays his Turkish identity. Such a portrayal of Akın reflects a process of othering that ultimately constructs an image of him as a "fixed reality which is at once other and yet entirely knowable and visible" (Bhabha 1983: 21). This underlines Akın's hybridity that makes it possible for others to distil certain specificities of identity out of these hyphenated nationals. They can either be included through praise or excluded through othering.

The majority of the news coverage that prioritizes the national identity of the filmmakers in question serves to build a narrative that glorifies Turkish identity and endorses national pride. A readily available repertoire of discursive strategies has been employed since the early 1980s. Undermining the very components of the "sacred" and "inviolable" Turkish national identity, only the marginal leftist newspaper *Evoysel* and the political Islamist *Zaman* are distinguished from the rest with their challenging interpretation of identity. They highlight the complicated nature of identity and how it is shaped by a variety of factors such as ethnic, cultural, and religious allegiances. In brief, the general tendency in the Turkish press appears to prey on the ambiguous sense of belonging by Turkish German filmmakers.

In conclusion, the Turkish press cannot engage with these filmmakers on their own terms, but seeks to frame them in the context of Turkish concerns, predominantly over the relationship with Europe: firstly, in terms of the political negotiations with the EU, and secondly in terms of Turkish

national identity and pride. In fact, both aspects are two sides of the same coin in so far as both are about combating a sense of inferiority with regard to Europe, which epitomizes civilization and modernity. In the 1980s the dominant narrative promulgated by the political classes was that of European discrimination against Turks, whereas now it seems opportune to promote the idea that the relationship between Turkey and Europe is growing stronger. While all newspapers subscribe to this agenda, there are nuanced differences that reflect the papers' political and ideological standpoints. The contestability of the filmmakers' hybrid identities lends itself well to strategic deployment by the press. The press can highlight different aspects selectively for their particular purposes, and most papers prefer to reduce these complex identities to monolithic ones. In a nutshell, the press uses the filmmakers both as supposed ambassadors in the context of EU relations, and as devices for exploring what Turkish identity is supposed to be.

Notes

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1. See Rendi (2006) and Berghahn (2006) with reference to Kulaoğlu (1999).
2. For further statistics and reviews on the issue, see the webpage of the Press and Publicity Head Office: <http://www.bik.gov.tr>.
3. For a detailed historical analysis of the Turkish press see Erdoğan (2007), Christensen (2007), Darendeli (2007), Adaklı (2006 and 2003), Bek (2004), Kejanlıoğlu (2004), Tuñç (2004 and 2002), and Finkel (2000). The structure of the Turkish press is very dynamic and undergoing rapid change.
4. See Itzigsohn (2000) for a detailed discussion of institutional patterns of transnational politics and economics. He argues that the novelty of contemporary transnationalism resides in the high degree of institutionalization of transnational linkages.
5. Here Atatürk actually refers to western societies.
6. Also see Keyman (2003), Inac (2003), Kahraman (2001 and 1999), Inalcık (1998), Göle (1998) and Belge (1983) for comprehensive discussions of the Turkish modernization project.
7. The year 2004 also constitutes a particularly significant date in terms of Turkey's process of accession to the EU. Having applied for full membership in the EU in 1987, Turkey was finally endorsed to begin the negotiation process subsequent to a decision made at the Brussels Summit in 2004 (see Yetkin 2002; Belge 2003; and Erol and Efeğil 2007 for detailed analyses of Turkish-EU relations). This meant Turkey got one step closer to its perpetually pursued ideal of becoming an EU country. Consequently the public interest and the resulting press coverage of the issue inevitably escalated and intensified from then on.
8. The abundance of news items without named authors reinforces the argument that these stories actually reflect the papers' editorial and ideological positioning.
9. According to the statistics revealed by Ali Çarkoğlu, the majority of the Turkish population was supportive of the EU at this point.

10. It is widely known that together with the main opposition party CHP, *Cumhuriyet* has a wary attitude concerning Turkey-EU relations, since it does not support Turkey's membership unconditionally.
11. See Türker (2009) for a recent debate on the official, however implicit, state policies over Kurds and their consequences.
12. *Zaman* has mitigated, if not totally surrendered, its negative attitude towards the membership in the EU in line with the incumbent Islamist party AKP's temperate approach. Nonetheless, it still does not cover any news stories about Turkish German filmmakers and the EU.
13. The term "Turk" actually had derogatory connotations during the Ottoman era as it was used to address nomads or illiterate and rude peasants (see Güvenç 2005 for a detailed analysis of the history and etymology of the term).
14. See Gökalp (1923); Gürsoy and Çapçioğlu (2006).
15. The role of the press in the making of a nation is neither a new phenomenon nor particular to the Turkish press. See Anderson (1983) for instance.
16. For examples, see *Cumhuriyet* news items and reviews: Başutçu (1986a and 1986b), Dorsay (1986, 1989, 1991a, and 1991b), Yüreklik (1989a, 1989b, and 1991), Sayar (1991a and 1991b), and *Hürriyet* (1991).
17. Fatih Akin is the namesake of an Ottoman Emperor, Fatih the Conquerer.