The “water wars” in the Tampa Bay region between the governments of Pasco, Pinellas, and Hillsborough Counties and the cities of St. Petersburg, Tampa, and New Port Richey began in the early 1970s when densely populated but water-poor Pinellas County started buying land and developing drinking-water wellfields in Pasco and Hillsborough Counties (Figure 4-1). Groundwater pumping in the Tampa Bay region increased 400 percent between 1960 and 1996, and currently over 20 billion gallons of water is exported from Pasco County to Pinellas County every year (Glennon 2002). Pasco and Hillsborough Counties were not happy with the southbound flow of the water. The impact of the wells on lakes and wetlands, including damage to local residents’ homes, prompted countless legal challenges, but courts and the legislature supported the claims of Pinellas County and the city of St. Petersburg. This chapter analyzes two attempts to create institutions to resolve the conflict, one that failed and the current one that holds some promise. We present the history in some detail to demonstrate the complexity of resolving conflicts, and then consider lessons for adaptive governance.

A Brief History of the Tampa Bay Conflict

The First Regional Authority
In October 1974, West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority (West Coast) was created by the Florida legislature “in response to concerns over negative environmental impacts associated with uncoordinated development of, and competition for, the Tampa Bay region’s fresh water sources” (Meinhart 1989). West Coast existed by contract among voting members including Pinellas, Hillsborough, and Pasco countries, and the cities of St. Petersburg and Tampa. The city of New Port Richey had a seat but no vote. West Coast’s board was made up of elected officials or designated representatives from each local government; they agreed to buy water from West Coast, which in turn bought and developed the well fields. The Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD) and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) were involved as regulating and permitting agencies (see Chapter 2).

Initial Success: Developing a Regional Water Supply Plan

Plans for joint development of future water supplies for the region were constantly hampered by parochial attitudes of West Coast members. Pinellas continued buying well fields in Pasco and held its participation in the $125 million Cypress Bridge well field hostage to pressure the other parties in other issues. Neither that project nor West Coast could continue without Pinellas. During discussions of common ownership of all facilities and a single water rate for all member governments to replace the different rates based on the facilities owned, Pasco County resisted giving up the first right to water from its wells. Guarantees that were satisfactory to Pasco County were not acceptable to Pinellas County. After months of negotiations, in July 1991 they signed an agreement that gave Pasco control of development of wells in most of the county, but allowed Pinellas to build new wells in two fields without Pasco’s permission. This historic agreement was seen as the beginning of true regional cooperation and the end of the water wars.
Recurrent Conflict: Limiting Groundwater Extraction

Unfortunately, neither West Coast nor the 1991 agreement resolved the underlying conflict over claims that overpumping was damaging property and habitat close to well fields. For a long time, both West Coast and the permitting authority, SWFWMD, claimed that drought, not pumping, was responsible for declining water levels. But more citizens complained about the environmental impacts of groundwater pumping through letters, phone calls, and personal appearances in front of the SWFWMD Governing Board (Glennon 2002). In response to escalating complaints, early in 1993 SWFWMD developed new regulations to curb saltwater intrusion into groundwater sources and denied a construction permit that effectively put on hold several parts of the critical Cypress Bridge project. In 1994 the board asked the staff to determine the “minimum amount of water needed for health and safety” (Rand 2000) in order to formalize the new policy recognizing the problem of overpumping.

The ensuing SWFWMD actions suggest that Florida’s water management districts recognize a responsibility to resolve such disputes, but their ability to do so remains under challenge. West Coast and SWFWMD pushed for conservation as an alternative to new supply development, but area governments continued their longstanding resistance to restricting access to groundwater. Pinellas County leaders in particular worried that water restrictions would kill growth and the economy (Garcia 1993; Garcia and Rogers 1993). SWFWMD then proposed “Water Shortage Orders” to force local governments to take specific actions to reduce water demand (Rand 2000). When West Coast, Pinellas County, and St. Petersburg immediately filed suit against two proposed orders, SWFWMD changed tactics and issued Emergency Order 94-12 in June 1994 to West Coast and its members to reduce groundwater withdrawals, claiming that
pumping from well fields had drained lakes and wetlands, killed wildlife, and ruined homeowners’ wells. Unlike the Water Shortage Order, an Emergency Order takes effect immediately until a court overturns it. Thus the consequences could be felt immediately to the extent that the concurrency requirements of the 1985 State Growth Management Act prohibit the approval of any new development until adequate public facilities, including potable water, are in place (Planning 1995). In September 1994, West Coast sued SWFWMD to rescind the Emergency Order.

These actions triggered the most intensive battles of the water wars: West Coast, its member governments, and SWFWMD spent more than $10 million on legal disputes between 1994 and 1998.

By March of 1994, every local government and even some of the activists retained counsel and prepared for war. There were in-house lawyers, outside counsel, general counsel and experts on all sides—all paid for with public dollars…[Residents] were paying for at least six lawyers on all sides of the case. (Rand 2000)

[Emphasis added]

The immediate threat to development and the ensuing legal battles stimulated political intervention. In October 1994 Governor Lawton Chiles formed the Tampa Bay Water Coordinating Council, bringing together SWFWMD and local government leaders to seek a consensus on how to develop and equitably distribute Tampa Bay’s water supply to meet existing and future demand while protecting water and associated environmental resources. The
Council issued a draft report in early 1995 which recognized the need for new partnerships to resolve differences among the many affected jurisdictions and interests (Jones 1996a).

A truce brokered by Senator Jack Latvala (representative of north Pinellas and west Pasco Counties) led to agreement in July 1995 on a 35-year regional water supply plan as well as a withdrawal of the Emergency Order and subsequent litigation. The plan included more surface water, recycled water, and conservation to reduce use of groundwater. The direct participation of Tampa Mayor Dick Greco and St. Petersburg Mayor David Fischer, along with the absence of Pinellas County Commissioner Charles Rainey (for health reasons), were critical in producing a 4-0 vote in West Coast strongly backing the new plan.

The Coalition of Lake Associations (COLA), representing more than 3,000 property owners in Pasco, Hernando, and Hillsborough Counties, prepared a class-action lawsuit in December 1995 to reduce overpumping and recoup monetary damages from West Coast, Pinellas County, and St. Petersburg as well field operators. The following month, Pinellas County filed a preemptive lawsuit against COLA, SWFWMD, and eight citizens. Pinellas’ lawsuit was interpreted as a “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation” (SLAPP) by those who claimed Pinellas sought to use judicial process to intimidate citizens, stifle legitimate public debate, and silence the opposition (Duckworth 1996). To counter SWFWMD’s claim of long-term water shortages (backed by a $2.7 million dollar public relations department), Pinellas increased funding for its public awareness campaign from the originally budgeted $300,000 to $800,000 to convince citizens that the environmental impacts on the lakes and wetlands were due to drought, not overpumping (Seaton and Thalji 1996).

The debate of liability was reduced to the interpretation of the word “overpumped”, with West Coast, Pinellas, and St. Petersburg defining the term as exceeding permitted quantities,
while SWFWMD—which admitted having “overpermitted” (Olinger 1994)—interpreting “overpumping” to mean “too much water being taken from the ground” (Rand 2000). The determination one way or another was critical because of its very different policy implications as well as establishment of liability to pay for the damage and the new supplies.

From a strictly legal standpoint Pinellas’ suit was not SLAPP, but some claimed it had the same effect of discouraging public participation (Rand 2000). A published apology in 1999 and the $341,600 settlement for the activists that hadn’t settled before might be considered a small victory for the citizens. However, controversy over how to deal with the issue caused the resignation of some COLA board members, and the pressure of the lawsuit resulted in the eventual disbanding of the coalition. These results illustrate the difficulty that affected groups can face when they try to participate in the judicial arena.

In January 1996 the Pinellas County Commission, West Coast, and SWFWMD attempted a joint scientific expert review with the assistance of the Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium to “resolve the scientific issues in dispute involved in the planning and regulatory activities used by SWFWMD to meet the District’s responsibility in allocating water withdrawals” (Jones 1996b). A joint panel of scientific experts responded to a list of questions with a report, but it produced no direct actions to resolve how much water each permit-holder could pump.

An administrative hearing prompted by SWFWMD’s Emergency Order for four well field permits was scheduled for late July 1996. St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, and West Coast challenged the permits that required pumping to stop if surface water or the aquifer drop below certain levels. One week before the hearing, SWFWMD dropped environment-related conditions from the permit renewal applications, but then denied permit applications because the applicants failed to prove pumping would not harm the environment. This shifted the burden of proof about
acceptable levels of pumping from SWFWMD to the applicants. The conflict became so intense that Pasco and Hillsborough appeared ready to pull out of West Coast (Pilla 1996). The hearing issued a Recommended Order directing SWFWMD to renew the permits for the well fields, but a final decision was repeatedly delayed to allow SWFWMD and West Coast to negotiate a deal that would end the controversy.

Legislative Intervention

During the ongoing dispute, Pasco County leaders and others had appealed to the legislature for help in reforming state water policy. In response, the Florida Senate and House of Representatives set up select committees to hold hearings under Senator Latvala and Representative R. Z. Safley. The resultant Water Resources Act was signed in May 1996 after many controversial proposals, including “local sources first” pushed by Pasco activists, were discarded. Most critically, the bill imposed a deadline of October 1997 for SWFWMD to set minimum water levels for lakes, wetlands, and aquifers in priority areas in Pasco, Hillsborough, and Pinellas, and to undertake studies to determine the relative impact of pumping versus drought on water levels. Furthermore, West Coast was directed to consider a series of reforms and report its findings to the legislature the following February.

The deadlines were critical incentives to resolve the disputes. Worried that if they did not do something on their own the legislature would impose a solution, West Coast officials approved a restructuring in December 1996 which would turn West Coast into a true utility. All members would pay the same wholesale rate for water and share the costs of developing new water sources. This would enable them to develop alternative sources such as a desalination plant. Member governments would turn over their well fields to West Coast and the board would
be expanded from five members to nine, three from each county. Making the city of New Port Richey a voting member would increase Pasco County’s representation from 20 to 33 percent. All would be elected officials, and a majority would rule. By January 1997, all parties approved the regional Water Supply Plan that included the reorganization of West Coast.

The legislature’s October 1 deadline to SWFWMD to set minimum levels and flows put pressure on the negotiations. The toughest issue was Tampa’s reluctance to give up its independence from West Coast. Among various special exemptions, Tampa requested unlimited ability to develop new water resources on its own from the Hillsborough River and to continue to own and operate the Tampa Bypass Canal. Pinellas, on the other hand, wanted to control the quality of its water, particularly a veto on the reuse of recovered wastewater. The negotiations dragged on until October, but finally resolved these issues.

Monetary incentives were also critical for achieving a settlement. In March 1997, SWFWMD offered West Coast $325 million over 10 years from the District’s New Water Sources Initiative funding to help develop new water supplies. In exchange, West Coast would reduce groundwater pumping to the specified levels and not challenge SWFWMD’s environmental protection decisions. This enabled SWFWMD to set minimum flow and level (MFL) rules on September 9, fulfilling its obligation to the state legislature.

After two years of intensive negotiation, all the pieces were in place to resolve the overpumping issue. West Coast’s board approved the restructuring plan in March 1998. SWFWMD approved the Northern Tampa Bay New Water Supply and Ground Water Withdrawal Reduction Agreement (the Partnership Agreement) in May 1998. Each member government waived its right to individually develop water supplies and transferred its facilities to the newly formed Tampa Bay Water on October 1, 1998 (Tampa Bay Water n.d.).
**Tampa Bay Water**

Since its inception, Tampa Bay Water has demonstrated an ability to resolve conflicts in a manner that at least allows progress in building and maintaining infrastructure necessary to mitigate environmental damages while fulfilling water supply obligations to member governments. Conflicts inevitably arise over the location, timing, and nature of individual projects, and meeting the pumping reduction requirements of the Partnership Agreement presents significant challenges to the Authority (Glennon 2002).

For example, the development of a saltwater desalination plant in southern Hillsborough County is vital to Tampa Bay Water’s plan to meet the required reductions for pumping groundwater. However, the Tampa Bay National Estuary Program and citizens expressed concern that reducing the amount of fresh water that reached Tampa Bay with the new reservoir project, combined with the discharge of brine from the desalination plant, would dangerously increase salinity in the bay. In November 1999 Save Our Bays and Canals (SOBAC) formed to oppose the desalination plant. They challenged the proposed FDEP permit in order to make the plant dispose of the effluent in another way, such as piping it into deeper waters and installing equipment to raise dissolved oxygen levels in the discharge (Brookes 2001). Mediation sessions failed to resolve the differences and the case went to hearing at FDEP (Swichtenberg 2001). The administrative law judge rejected SOBAC’s challenge in October 2001 (Tampa Bay Water 2001) and the desalination plant started operation on March 16, 2003 (Tampa Bay Soundings 2003). However, the impacts on the environment are still uncertain since the plant has been mostly inactive since February 2004 due to efficiency problems and will not operate until late 2006 when the repairs will be completed (Membrane and Separation Technology News 2005).
Lessons for Adaptive Governance

*Representation*

Although not directly involved in the Tampa Bay disputes, elected state officials oversaw regional problems. The legislature and governor both provided alternative institutions for resolving the Tampa Bay disputes. In response to escalating litigation among local governments and regulatory authorities, the Florida State legislature was instrumental in the creation of West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority and later in its transformation into Tampa Bay Water. Governor Lawton Chiles formed the Tampa Bay Water Coordinating Council in October 1994.

Local elected and appointed officials initially reflected the traditional interests of their constituency, so the change from adversarial to collaborative methods in part reflected changing personalities and career incentives. Charles Rainey, Pinellas County Commissioner for over 30 years and West Coast board member from its creation in 1974 to 1996, represented the old guard. “The Pinellas County commissioner virtually founded the authority and acts as if he owns it” (Editorial 1995c). Rainey has been accused of being mostly responsible “for creating such a hostile environment in which compromise and conciliation are not even discussed…confrontational…parochial and litigious approach” (Editorial 1995d) and for using courts instead of other means.

When the winds started to change, Rainey retired two years before the end of his term. “Rainey, who dominated West Coast from its start, staunchly opposed efforts to reduce dependence on well fields or develop alternative water sources, such as desalination. When Rainey left office and West Coast, momentum for a compromise quickly began to build”
Rainey was replaced by Steve Seibert, the only Pinellas Commissioner who had opposed the 1996 SLAPP lawsuit.

The restructuring of West Coast and the Partnership Agreement came only after some of the key people who had carved out strong positions left or changed tactics. West Coast General Counsel Ed de la Parte’s legal firm had represented West Coast over 20 years, earning over $6 million (Friedman 1994). With the revelation in 1993 that West Coast had the third-highest legal bills in all of state government de la Parte resigned as general counsel, but his status as “West Coast’s de facto chief policymaker” did not change because he immediately started representing Pinellas County (Friedman 1994).

Mark Farrell and Pete Hubbell, two top executives of SWFWMD involved in the early conflict, also left. The new director, Sonny Vergara, had ten years of water supply experience, a fact appreciated by the West Coast board. Another new voice was the mayor of St. Petersburg, David Fischer, who replaced one of his city councilmen in the West Coast board and favored the formation of a true regional water utility. First-term State Senator Jack Latvala, whose constituency spanned the two major combatant counties, mediated the dispute between Pinellas County and SWFWMD over the Emergency Order (Moncada 1995b; Editorial 1995a) and played a major role in getting legislative approval for reorganization of West Coast and developing new water supplies.

Design of Decision Processes

Jones (1996a) emphasizes a fundamental structural water supply problem “in that most water issues are regional in nature, while most water suppliers are local”. The regional water management districts have regional authority, but the transformation from their original mission
of flood control to the water resource protection authority provided in 1973 took considerable time, particularly since existing long-term groundwater permits did not account for environmental quality impacts. Furthermore, SWFWMD’s permitting authority provided no means of developing alternative sources of water. Nor did courts provide an effective venue for resolving the conflict:

Judicial rulings produced mixed results, recognizing the connection between groundwater withdrawals and environmental damage, but not supporting pumping reductions because of the fear of possible consequences resulting from public supply reductions in the absence of any new sources coming on line. (SWFWMD 2001)

West Coast showed promise of finding a regional solution, but its five voting member structure gave Pasco only one vote while Pinellas had two, so Pinellas and St. Petersburg maintained control. Tampa often sided with Pinellas, voting to pump more water from Pasco and Hillsborough; Tampa was generally unaffected, and Pinellas and St. Petersburg’s positions made engineering sense to the staff engineer representing Tampa (Rand 2000). Furthermore, local governments could refuse to participate in funding (Rand 2000); Pinellas County regularly refused to pay for alternative source development, which essentially blocked sources other than groundwater because other jurisdictions could not fund these projects themselves.

Compared to West Coast, Tampa Bay Water has the authority, control, and funding to meet its responsibility of providing water in the most cost-effective and environmentally
sensitive way possible (Rand 2000). Tampa Bay Water’s board provides more balanced representation among regional entities. The nine-member board of directors includes two elected representatives from each member county and one from each city. Of equal importance, Tampa Bay Water has developed a binding arbitration process for counties that disagree with a project. After the arbitration in May 2001 over the new reservoir in Hillsborough County, Tampa Bay Water manager Jerry Maxwell stated that alternative dispute resolution shortened the time to about a third, lowered the cost, and led to a reasonable solution (Heller 2001). The arbitration panel ordered the utility to give assurances that chemically treated water seeping from the reservoir would not damage septic systems or local wetlands.

Despite the structural advantages over the previous authority, Tampa Bay Water has had its share of problems, particularly in terms of institutional memory loss that follow shifts in personnel. In particular, only two holdovers from the founding group took part in the 1998 Water Supply Plan discussion. No new leader emerged to fill the role of former Hillsborough County Commissioner Ed Turanchik, the chair of West Coast during the restructuring, and former Pinellas Commissioner Steve Seibert. The inexperience of new board members in working together, their lack of information about the water problems and alternative solutions, and the reemergence of parochial interests all combined to slow progress in developing the plan.

_Scientific Learning_

Scientific uncertainty played an important role in Tampa Bay’s water wars, particularly in assessing whether groundwater pumping limits were necessary. Throughout the 1980s SWFWMD agreed with West Coast that drought was causing the environmental problems, but a seven-year Water Resources Assessment study started in 1987 demonstrated that the cause of
environmental problems in wetlands and lakes of western Hillsborough and central Pasco Counties was not lack of rainfall, but well field pumping. Rand (2000) sees this as a major reversal of policy for SWFWMD. However, convincing the local governments to restrict pumping took considerably longer. Scientific uncertainty remains a source of contention, most recently over the effects of the water desalination plants and of changes in salinity on the bay.

Public Learning

The media was interested in the conflict throughout its long history, and lent support to the claims of Pasco and Hillsborough Counties and citizens about the impact of pumping on property owners and habitats. Rand (2000) notes that during May and June 1994, which she describes as the height of water wars, the *Tampa Tribune* and *St. Petersburg Times* published at least 183 articles on the issue. The *Times* especially pressured both SWFWMD and West Coast to protect the water resources. After changing their position on whether drought or overpumping was causing environmental damage, SWFWMD had the media and the activists on its side and reportedly had 80 percent support (Rand 2000). Pinellas County’s decision to invest in public relations in 1995 was an acknowledgement that SWFWMD’s campaign was working and Pinellas had to respond in kind.

Throughout Tampa Bay’s water wars, facilitative approaches were used several times. The Tampa Bay Water Coordinating Council in 1994 and the joint scientific expert review in 1996 each produced a report, but the reports were not linked either to public education or to subsequent decisions. However, a facilitator helped the West Coast board reach a consensus during the restructuring negotiations. Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium Director Robert Jones (2003) claims that although none of these efforts solved the problem by itself, each
contributed to the resolution through learning not just about the scientific bases of policy, but also about the alternatives and the costliness of the conflict. Perhaps the heavy costs in litigation and stalled investments provided the strongest incentive for creating Tampa Bay Water: a prime example of the “hurtful stalemates” that sometimes induce adaptive governance.

_Problem Responsiveness_

Tampa Bay water conflict illustrates the consequences of privatizing a common property resource and the difficulty of negotiating a shift from this system to a jointly managed property rights system. Groundwater has been included in ownership of overlying land under eastern water law, giving the landowner exclusive rights to its use. In the mid-twentieth century, owners’ rights in Florida were limited by permit requirements (see Chapter 2). This system of rights was difficult to reform, although changes in permits eventually forced the institutional changes required to develop infrastructure and sustainable use patterns.

Inequity of amount and price of water between different local governments was historically a big problem. Under West Coast each government bought water at a different rate according to which facilities they owned; in some cases Pinellas County paid less for drinking water pumped from the other counties than did those counties. Pinellas County and the city of St. Petersburg systematically benefited from cheap imported water while damaging Pasco and Hillsborough Counties, which had no control over the water exported from their counties.

Different stages of development contributed to the problem. Newly growing Pasco and Hillsborough Counties were water donors while old growth Pinellas was an importer. Pasco and Hillsborough opposed most of the new projects within their borders and proposed a brackish water treatment plant in Pinellas County so Pinellas would contribute its share to the water
supply. Pinellas objected to conservation efforts and sources other than groundwater because groundwater was much cheaper, and cheap water was important to sustain growth. Especially throughout 1970s and 1980s, the growth proponents, including developers and builders, dominated Pinellas County. In a *St. Petersburg Times* article Friedman (1994) claims that

There’s no money to be made in conservation…but there is big money to be made from the construction and technology needed to tap new water sources. And of course, nobody makes more money than the developers who depend on water to lubricate continued growth up and down Tampa Bay.

Others expressed similar sentiments about Pinellas and St. Petersburg’s resistance to change. “That’s why they have spent millions of tax dollars fighting to keep on pumping. For money. Not for water” (Clarke 1996). “This isn’t about water, it’s about money. It’s about development, and the engine that drives development is water” (Barry 1996).

Initially it seemed cheaper to litigate, but courts never efficiently resolved disputes in the water wars. Major projects to improve the water supply infrastructure were held up. Clearly, the court system imposed very high transaction costs before a negotiated restructuring and regional planning ended the era of unlimited groundwater, the unequal rate structure, and rejection of alternatives to groundwater.
Conclusions

This study of the Tampa Bay water wars highlights several key factors that were instrumental in sustaining, and then ending, the conflict.

Lack of binding authority: Tampa Bay Water Coordinating Council is regarded as a failure due to lack of binding authority, which enabled Pinellas County to withdraw its support when things did not go as they wished. Jones (1996a) argues that many of the recommendations from the Council’s report have been incorporated in subsequent plans and agreements, but the Council did not change the local governments’ handling of water supply in any fundamental and immediate way. Decisionmaking by unanimous vote resulted in lack of binding authority; West Coast failed to settle the water wars because a single member government could kill a project.

Reluctance to give up existing advantages and independence from other local governments: Pasco’s insistence on control of its groundwater, Tampa’s reliance on the Hillsborough River for its water supply rather than groundwater supplied by West Coast, and resulting independence from the other governments obstructed negotiations for restructuring West Coast into Tampa Bay Water.

Nature of representation on the West Coast board: The presence of Tampa Mayor Dick Greco and St. Petersburg Mayor David Fischer on the West Coast board, instead of subordinates, contributed to agreement on the 35-year regional water supply plan. Tampa’s representation by a non-elected official had created conflict, especially when Tampa voted together with Pinellas and St. Petersburg.

Loss of institutional memory: Key people who had negotiated the restructuring and the Partnership Agreement left the board. With only two holdovers from the initial group in the Tampa Bay Water’s board, parochialism and talk of water wars reemerged during the discussions
of the 1998 Water Supply Plan. Pasco’s seat on the board changed hands five times within two and a half years of reorganization and interrupted continuity: “The revolving door at Tampa Bay Water is a legitimate concern because newer members, unfamiliar with the aggressive schedule for developing new water sources and reducing groundwater pumping in Pasco, often are accompanied by a ‘let’s-do-more study’ attitude that translates into little more than delays” (Editorial 2000).

*Threat of an imposed solution by the legislature:* One factor that drove West Coast’s restructuring was members’ fear that if they did not do something on their own, the legislature would impose a solution. All agreed that “a solution of their design was better than one imposed from Tallahassee” (Rand 2000).

*Financial incentives:* The development of alternative supplies was repeatedly thwarted because the local governments could not agree on how to share the cost until the proposal of the Partnership Agreement (The Economist 1998).

*Change of personalities:* The change from the adversarial to a collaborative approach is attributed to a shift in personalities, especially on the West Coast board, from established officials with careers invested in their positions on water to younger, more conciliatory voices.

*Threat of a deadline:* The approaching hearing date curtailed the dispute over SWFWMD’s 1994 Emergency Order to stop overpumping. Pressure to resolve the issue by October 1, 1997, the deadline set by the legislature to determine minimum flows, was again crucial in moving things along during the discussions to restructure West Coast.